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Five Ways to Write Like Judge Posner

Judge Richard Posner, who died on November 10, 2026, at 87, spent 36 years on the Seventh Circuit and wrote around 3,300 opinions. The University of Chicago Law School, where he taught (and I learned), remembers a judge who “disdained jargon-filled opinions.”

Many others will cover his endearing personality and his law-and-economics genius. I’m fascinated by his sentences.

In Point Taken, I called Posner Lord Denning’s American heir apparent. Posner’s own label, borrowed from Robert Penn Warren’s famous formulation about poetry, was the Impure style: prose that sounds like a person talking, as against the lofty and formal Pure style of a Cardozo.

I wouldn’t copy everything he did. The five techniques below are the ones I’d use for inspiration, all accompanied by examples from my book and from opinions he wrote in 2016 and 2017.

Emphasis added in quotations.

1. Chekhov’s Gun

“At once too many and too few,” Posner said of the facts in most opinions. He chided judges who include details that are “irrelevant as well as uninteresting,” such as gratuitous names and dates, and who yet say nothing about matters that are “interesting and important.”

He showed what he meant by rewriting part of an opinion by a D.C. Circuit judge whose work he admired. Here is her original description of a search:

On December 11, 1990, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department executed a search warrant on a one-bedroom apartment at 2525 14th Street, N.E., in the District of Columbia. Upon entering the apartment, the officers found appellant seated on a small couch in the living room; they detained him while they searched the apartment. The search produced two ziplock bags containing a total of 15.7 grams of crack cocaine divided among 100 smaller ziplock bags, $500 in cash, empty ziplock bags, razor blades, and three loaded and operable pistols. Two of the guns were under the cushions of the couch on which appellant sat; the third was in a nightstand in the bedroom.

And here is Posner’s taut rendition, from his 2013 book Reflections on Judging, which I reproduced in Point Taken:

Police had a warrant to search a one-bedroom apartment. Upon entering they found the defendant sitting on a small couch in the living room. The search revealed drugs, cash, and drug paraphernalia, and also three pistols—two under the cushions of the couch and the third in a nightstand in the bedroom.

Gone: the date, street address, department name, and packaging details. Posner retains only what bears on the questions before the court: whether the defendant was living at the apartment and whether he used guns during the crime. Both the one-bedroom apartment and the couch thus make the cut.

Yet lean facts don’t necessarily mean few facts. In Cecaj v. Gonzales, for example, his opening paragraph leads us through arrests, beatings, death threats, and the kidnapping of an asylum seeker’s ten-year-old brother. All that to set up the next paragraph:

The immigration judge ruled that Cecaj’s testimony did not establish that he had been persecuted.

Against all that harrowing detail comes the discrepancy. Posner does not announce his decision (he believed that judges should wait until the end to do so), but his word choices and writing style telegraph the ultimate outcome. And the passive verbs in the narrative—“was arrested,” “was detained,” “was beaten”—keep the victim at the center of the story.

It’s no surprise that when I ask judges what they dislike about briefs, the cry of “too many dates” often tops the list.

2. Let Me Explain

Posner’s opinions often make you feel smarter.

Sitting as a trial judge in Apple v. Motorola in 2012, he likened a smartphone’s notification window to an automobile’s dashboard. Then, rather than repeatedly distinguish phones from other handheld devices, he offered this aside:

… but for simplicity I’ll pretend in this opinion that the case involves just cell phones …

Posner explains the technology, offers a familiar comparison, and tells the reader what he is simplifying.

Four years later, in Illinois Transportation Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, Judge Posner made a similar writing choice. The 2016 case involved taxis and “Transportation Network Providers,” but he declined to make the reader learn the label:

Because the acronym TNPs is not well known, nor the term ridesharing services, but Uber is very well known, we’ll focus on Uber…

His transitions were just as conversational. Indiana Harbor Belt, his 1990 opinion on strict liability, interrupts its economic analysis with “Anyway, rerouting is no panacea.” Twenty-six years later, he reaches for the same word in the Uber opinion: “Anyway the City is not confiscating any taxi medallions; it is merely exposing the taxicab companies to new competition—competition from Uber and the other TNPs.”

He had less patience for the stock phrases of his own profession. In a 2016 concurrence in United States v. Dessart, he agreed with the result but objected to the language used to explain it. Judicial opinions, he wrote, are “littered with stale, opaque, confusing jargon. There is no need for jargon, stale or fresh.”

In Point Taken, I questioned whether terms like abuse of discretion always have a better substitute. But keeping a term of art doesn’t excuse us from explaining what it means. And outside true terms of art, we can all favor also over additionally and under over pursuant to.

3. Asked and Answered

Posner’s conversational style helped persuade skeptical readers to adopt his conclusions.

In Cecaj, the immigration judge had discounted a police beating because Cecaj wasn’t carrying identification papers. Posner responded:

Do Albanian police routinely beat people who fail to carry identification? Maybe so, but taken together with the other evidence in the case the beating was further evidence of persecution.

“Maybe so” is a concession in two words. The question is rhetorical in feel, worded in a way that stacks the deck, but Posner answers it all the same.

The more I dissect his prose, the more I tip my hat to his transitions. Admire these four near the end of the opinion:

Thus, the immigration judge’s finding that Cecaj was not a victim of persecution on account of his political activity is not supported by substantial evidence. Even so, he is not entitled to asylum unless he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted should he be returned to Albania. … Maybe Cecaj will be safe if he returns and resumes his political career. But once past persecution is shown, the burden shifts to the government to establish that the alien lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution.

A conclusion, a qualification, a possibility, and an answer. He uses one transition per point, and none runs longer than two words. Not a single nonetheless in sight.

Sometimes the question becomes the argument. In the Uber opinion, Judge Posner lists the rivals that taxi-medallion owners cannot shut out (buses, trains, bicycles, even walking) and then asks:

Why then should the plaintiffs be allowed to exclude competition from Uber? To this question they offer no answer.

A brief doesn’t need many questions. One is enough if it is the question the court is likely asking and you answer it as Judge Posner did, with a “maybe so” for the counterargument first.

4. Bring Good Things to Life

How would you explain why a court shouldn’t borrow the limitations period from one statute and the accrual rule from another? You could discuss statutory coherence. Or you could do what Judge Posner did in Singletary v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.:

To take the period of limitations from one statute and the accrual date from another, however, is like grafting a giraffe’s head onto an alligator’s body.

What could have been a dry objection becomes a physical clash. Part of what makes the simile work is that an opinion about filing deadlines is the last place you’d expect to see it.

In Cecaj, he used a different image to expose what’s wrong with weighing each piece of evidence in isolation:

Suppose you saw someone holding a jar, and you said, “That’s a nice jar,” and he smashed it to smithereens and said, “No, it’s not a jar.” That is what the immigration judge did.

The analogy makes clear what the piece-by-piece approach loses: the pattern that emerges only when the evidence is considered as a unit.

In the 2016 Uber opinion, Posner explained why a taxi medallion conferred no right to exclude competing transportation services:

A license to operate a coffee shop doesn’t authorize the licensee to enjoin a tea shop from opening.

He then explained what protecting old businesses from new competitors could mean:

Instead of taxis we might have horse and buggies; instead of the telephone, the telegraph; instead of computers, slide rules. Obsolescence would equal entitlement.

His point: nobody mourns the horse and buggy, the telegraph, or the slide rule, yet that kind of protection is what the taxi owners demand.

If you want to follow his lead, make sure your image dovetails with your legal point, just as a smashed jar depicts evidence broken into shards.

5. Short Sentence for the Win

I’ve always advised both judges and lawyers to write at least one sentence per page that starts and ends on the same line. When Judge Posner does that, the zinger sentences draw attention to the points that matter most.

In his partial dissent in Johnson v. Phelan, for instance, he questioned the majority’s deference to jail administrators’ supposed judgments about cross-sex surveillance of naked detainees:

There is no record. The case was dismissed on the complaint.

The first sentence pokes holes in the premise. Judge Posner endorses deference on principle, but he asks how the majority could have deferred to a judgment that was never really made.

In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation, decided in 2016, involved a settlement providing $370,000 for class counsel and, in the court’s view, nothing of value for the shareholders. Judge Posner rejected it:

The type of class action illustrated by this case—the class action that yields fees for class counsel and nothing for the class—is no better than a racket. It must end.

The long sentence with the em dashes tells us what is wrong. The short one is closer to an order.

You’ll find a similar technique in his 2017 concurrence in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, a case about Title VII and sexual-orientation discrimination:

We should not leave the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th Congress (1963–1965), carrying out their wishes. We are not.

Agree or disagree, you always know where he stands.

What to Borrow

Start with the techniques that made Judge Posner’s style so easy to read. Cut a date and a fact that don’t matter. Drop a moreover and a consequently. And find the ideal spot for a confident four-word sentence.

For more than three decades, he showed us how to do all that and more.

Excerpts from opinions before 2016, and my commentary on them, draw on my book Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges (Oxford University Press 2014).

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Ross Guberman

Ross Guberman is the bestselling author of Point Made, Point Taken, and Point Well Made. A leading authority on legal writing, he is also the founder of BriefCatch, the AI-powered editing tool trusted by top law firms, courts, and agencies.

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